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The US dollar is not the world’s key currency by policy design, 
just as English is not the leading global language by policy 
design. It is the evolutionary outcome of practice and expe-
rience. It would take both a major shock to the dollar and 
a viable alternative to dislodge it from widespread use. Like 
a  common  language,  the  dollar  enjoys  “network  externali-
ties”—the greater the number of people who use and accept 
it, the more useful it is to everyone, and the more entrenched 
it becomes. Also, what is not quite the same thing, the dollar 
enjoys a large market in low-risk and highly liquid securities, 
most notably US Treasury bills; the liquidity both enhances 
and is enhanced by the network externalities. Most of the 
world’s  foreign  exchange  transactions  directly  involve  the   
US dollar. It is easy to hold and easy to use, even on a large 
scale. In short, it is highly convenient.
The dollar, however, has a disadvantage as a store of value 
in that its purchasing power is not constant (a concept that 
is itself ambiguous and varies from country to country). It 
shares this disadvantage with all other national currencies, and 
indeed over the past half century few countries have had a 
lower rate of inflation than the United States. Moreover, inter-
est rates on securities should, over time, compensate for any 
persistent decline in purchasing power, especially (in the case 
of the US dollar) from a US perspective; indeed, they may 
overcompensate in terms of internationally traded goods and 
services insofar as their prices rise less rapidly than US domes-
tic consumer prices.
A major change in these conditions could in time under-
mine confidence in the US dollar as a store of value. Erosion of 
its role as a temporary store of value would eventually reduce 
its role as a currency for transactions, although the two func-
tions need not evolve in lock-step.
Are there feasible alternatives to the US dollar as a widely 
used international currency? Two categories come to mind: a 
currency in actual use, such as the euro, the yen, the British 
pound, or even (as Nouriel Roubini has recently suggested) 
the  Chinese  yuan;  and  a  synthetic  currency  designed  for 
the purpose, of which the special drawing rights (SDRs) is 
currently the leading candidate, as recently hinted by Gover-
nor Zhou Xiaochuan of the People’s Bank of China. I discuss 
each of these alternatives below.
Other MajOr CurrenCies as alternatives 
tO the us DOllar
The euro was created legally in 1999 and began to circulate as 
currency in 2002. It has now replaced national currencies in 
16 countries; it is widely used in EU members that have not 
yet formally adopted it but are committed to doing so and 
in a number of would-be members of the European Union. 
Debt outstanding in 1998 was converted into euros, and since 
then participants in euroland have issued debt denominated 
in euros. The euro-based capital market has evolved greatly in 
the past decade.
Despite  great  progress,  the  euro  capital  market  is  still 
quite fragmented, with varying degrees of liquidity depend-
ing on the security. Holders of international reserves cannot 
hold euros; they have to hold euro-denominated securities, 
and the type of security makes a great deal of difference. The 
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most prevalent euro-denominated government securities are 
those  issued  by  the  Italian  government,  with  $1.8  trillion 
outstanding at the end of September 2008 (see table 1). Many 
central  banks  would  hesitate  to  hold  such  securities,  since 
Italian public debt exceeds GDP and the Italian government 
is not known for budgetary discipline or efficiency. German 
government debt outstanding was $1.4 trillion at the end of 
September 2008. But Germany over the years has had an aver-
sion to short-term debt, so only $266 billion of this debt had 
a maturity under one year. Moreover, German buyers tend to 
hold to maturity, so the secondary market is much less devel-
oped than it is in the United States or the United Kingdom, 
and German bonds are correspondingly less liquid. Table 1 
also reports the smaller amounts of euro-denominated govern-
ment debt of France and Spain, the next two largest issuers in 
euroland. So while in total there is much outstanding euro-
denominated public debt, the market is more fragmented and 
much less liquid than the market in US government securi-
ties, which in September 2008 totaled $7.3 trillion, including   
$2.1 trillion of short-term debt.
The secondary market is much better developed in the 
United  Kingdom,  but  the  amount  of  pound-denominated 
British government debt at $0.8 trillion is significantly smaller 
than the debt of the larger euroland countries. Canada has a 
somewhat smaller and less developed market than the United 
Kingdom.
Japan has extensive government debt, at $7.9 trillion, even 
more than the United States, and $2.3 trillion of this debt is 
short-term. There are three potential problems with Japanese 
securities as a basis for an international currency. First, the 
yield has been exceptionally low, below 1 percent on short-
term securities, during most of the past two decades. Second, 
while Japan has a relatively free market in public debt, it has 
a strong tradition of “guidance” by the Ministry of Finance, 
and this tradition has not entirely vanished. Foreigners might 
worry about new guidance that would limit their freedom of 
action and even discriminate against them in favor of domes-
tic holders. Third, among rich countries, Japan has the highest 
ratio of debt to GDP, well over 100 percent. This does not 
pose a financing problem with interest rates as low as they 
have recently been, but it might do so in the future, particu-
larly in view of the rapid aging of Japanese society (which I 
discuss further below).
China has almost as much government debt outstanding 
as Germany, $1.4 trillion, and over half of it is short term. 
China’s fiscal policy has been conservative, and the debt to 
GDP ratio is moderate at about 40 percent. But the Chinese 
capital market, including that for government securities, is not 
well developed; most purchasers hold until maturity. Foreign-
ers  at  present  do  not  have  access  to  Chinese  government 
securities at all, and the Chinese currency is not convertible 
for capital account transactions. Thus the yuan is not suitable 
for being an international currency at present. All that could 
change in the next few decades. Indeed, among the many 
objectives of China’s government are a much improved capital 
market and a fully convertible currency. But China’s financial 
system requires many improvements before these objectives 
can  be  securely  achieved,  and  these  improvements  are  not 
likely to take place quickly.
I  conclude  that,  essentially  on  technical  (market) 
grounds, none of the other leading currencies in the world 
today is ready to replace the US dollar in its international role. 
The international role of the euro is likely to increase in the 
coming decade as non-euroland members of the European 
Union and aspiring candidates increasingly use euros in their 
transactions with euroland countries—for invoicing, payment, 
and holding international balances. Other countries closely 
linked economically to Europe, such as Morocco, Tunisia, and 
perhaps Egypt, are likely to do the same. But this increasing 
use of the euro is not likely to displace the dollar at the global 
level. In a growing world economy, there is room for the euro 
to increase its share in reserve holdings even while the value of 
dollar holdings continues to rise. For diverse perspectives on 
the future of the euro, see Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2009).
Moreover, on current benign projections for the world 
economy, the shares of Europe and Japan are likely to fall 
significantly over the next two decades, largely for demographic 
reasons (Cooper 2008). Both parts of the world have low birth 
rates and are aging rapidly. The share of the United States, in 
contrast, will decline only modestly, due to higher birth rates 
and continued significant immigration, while those of China 
and other developing countries will grow significantly. Thus 
the relative importance of Europe and Japan as trading desti-
nations will gradually decline as that of successful developing 
Table 1     Government debt securities, September 
  2008 (billions of dollars)
Country Total
Maturity under  
one year
Japan 7,890 ,37





United Kingdom 843 105
Canada 708 150
Spain 514 118
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countries increases, while the United States continues to be 
by far the largest national economy, with only slight decline 
in share.
For  all  these  reasons,  and  assuming  the  United  States 
continues to manage its monetary and fiscal affairs in a reason-
able fashion and the US capital market remains open, the 
dollar is not likely to be seriously displaced. 
a synthetiC CurrenCy as an alternative 
What about the other possibility, a synthetic currency displac-
ing  the  US  dollar  in  its  international  role,  as  a  matter  of 
conscious  and  deliberate  collective  action?  This  possibility, 
suggested by Governor Zhou of China’s central bank in the 
spring of 2009, could be achieved by substantially augment-
ing the role of the SDR, a synthetic unit of account of the 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  defined  in  terms  of 
four currencies: the US dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, 
and the British pound. What is not generally known is that 
such a move has been an official objective of the international 
community since 1978, as stated in the second amendment 
to the IMF’s Articles of Agreement: members shall conduct 
their  policies  with  respect  to  reserve  assets  consistent  with 
“the objectives of promoting better international surveillance 
of international liquidity and making the special drawing right 
the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system” 
(Article VIII.7, emphasis added).
The issues here are conceptual, practical, and (if I may 
say so) aesthetic. The conceptual issues concern the net gains 
that may be expected to accrue to the world at large from 
creating a man-made international currency, compared with 
the  current  nonsystematic  practices,  relying  mainly  on  the   
US dollar. I will not review these gains in this brief, except 
to say that they are not completely obvious. Most of these 
gains will not occur without other important changes in the 
functioning of the international financial system, including 
international engagement in the role of national exchange rate 
policies, where changes would, if anything, be more contro-
versial than achieving wide acceptance of a synthetic interna-
tional currency.
The aesthetic issue concerns largely the offense that some 
observers take at having a national currency play the leading 
international role: It creates an asymmetry in a system that 
at least formally and legally (as in the United Nations Char-
ter and most other international treaties) treats all nations as 
equal. It also appears to give special privileges to the nation 
whose currency is used. I discuss this issue further below.
Most of the issues are practical, in principle solvable but 
often with difficulty and with undesirable and perhaps unac-
ceptable side effects. One practical matter concerns the prin-
ciples that would govern issuance of the synthetic currency, 
including  who  exactly  would  decide.  SDR  creation  under 
existing IMF arrangements involves a quinquennial evaluation 
of whether the world economy needs additional liquidity and 
a decision by IMF governors (essentially the finance ministers 
of the world) by an 85-percent-weighted vote (which gives 
the United States and the members of the European Union 
taken together effective veto power) on when and how much. 
Until 2009, only two successful issuances had been decided, 
in the late 1960s and in the late 1970s, for a total of SDR 22 
billion. A third, involving distribution to new members such 
as China and Russia, was decided in principle some years ago 
but implemented only in 2009, as was a new allocation worth 
$250 billion in response to the 2008–09 global financial and 
economic crisis. Many transactions in SDRs are in fact between 
national monetary authorities and the IMF itself. This arrange-
ment is unnecessarily cumbersome and time-consuming if the 
SDR is to become a truly international currency.
Only national monetary authorities, the IMF, and select-
ed designated institutions such as the World Bank and the 
Bank for International Settlements can use SDRs as currently 
constituted. Private parties outside the United States account 
for most holdings of US dollars, and financial markets are 
operated by and largely for private parties, with governments 
and central banks taking advantage of them. If the SDR were 
to become a truly international currency, it would have to be 
made accessible to private parties, or else the modus operandi 
of international financial relations would have to be radically 
revised. This applies to holdings of and payments in SDRs. 
Nothing prevents transactors in many countries today from 
using the SDR as a unit of account in their transactions with 
foreigners. The SDR is priced daily, indeed hourly, in terms 
of other currencies, so there is no ambiguity about its value 
at any moment. That it is not used widely suggests either that 
inertia in human behavior is very high, however irrational that 
may be, or that transactors see no compelling reason to shift to 
SDRs from dollars or whatever currency they may be using.
A third practical issue is, what would become of all the 
US dollars held in both private and official balances if the 
International use of the euro will grow, 
perhaps even more rapidly than that 
of the dollar for some years, but...it 
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SDR (or some other synthetic unit) replaced the US dollar? 
One approach would be to leave them and substitute SDRs 
through incremental growth, such that the US dollar (and 
other national currencies now held abroad) would gradually 
recede in relative importance, without any formal displace-
ment. Given the amount of foreign balances held today (over 
$5  trillion  in  official  reserves  alone),  it  would  take  a  very 
long time for the SDR to become the predominant reserve 
asset through such an approach—and perhaps it would never 
predominate in private balances, unless the process were forced 
in some way.
An alternative approach would involve the creation of a 
“substitution account” (Kenen 1981), whereby at least official 
holders and perhaps even private holders of dollars and other 
currencies would exchange their holdings for an equivalent 
value of SDRs. The question then arises, what would become 
of the dollars and other national currencies received in this 
arrangement—e.g., by the IMF or by an institution created 
for the purpose? Would they be held forever or amortized at 
some agreed rate? If they were amortized, what would be the 
implications for the world economy of both the United States 
and Europe having to run surpluses with no obvious coun-
terpart deficits? And would the obligors promise to maintain 
their SDR value? The latter condition would be a show-stop-
per for the United States, since no Congress would provide 
an unconditional guarantee of value for assets that, though 
issued by the US government, were issued in US dollars and 
voluntarily acquired by foreign parties.
Identifying  the  practical  problems  that  would  have  to 
be resolved in creating a synthetic international currency is 
useful, since it suggests that the gains from such a move would 
have to be sufficiently substantial to drive governments to try 
to solve those problems.
But it may be asked, won’t the US response to the current 
financial and economic crisis result in such a large public debt 
that the viability of the dollar as an international currency, and 
the willingness to hold it, comes into doubt? Such an outcome 
is possible but highly unlikely. It is unlikely because, messy 
as the US decision-making process is, the United States has 
so far not been fiscally indisciplined and is not likely to be in 
the future. The current borrowing needs are very large, partly 
to finance a recession-induced budget deficit augmented by 
a  fiscal  stimulus  package  and  partly  to  finance  support  to 
financial  institutions  whose  viability  has  been  impaired  by 
the  financial  crisis.  The  latter  financing  involves  purchases 
of financial assets, many of which will have significant value 
when the government support is unwound, so they will result 
in a substantial reduction of the budget deficit in future years 
(although exactly when and by how much is not yet known). 
The public debt will grow relative to GDP. But most other 
countries are also running substantial budget deficits and will 
also be adding to their outstanding debt, which relative to 
GDP is typically higher than that of the United States. And 
other rich countries are aging more rapidly and have prob-
lems of unfunded public entitlements that are comparable to 
or even worse than those in the United States. Thus in rela-
tive terms the financial position of the United States will not 
worsen significantly.
Some are concerned about the possibility of much higher 
inflation in the United States. This will not be a problem for 
the next several years. To be sure, the Federal Reserve has added 
significantly to its liabilities, so it must have an “exit strategy” 
as  the  economy  and  especially  financial  markets  return  to 
normal. But developing such a strategy is not a formidable 
technical problem and is being worked on now. Again, in the 
international context, a comparative perspective must be borne 
in mind; other countries face similar challenges. The SDR, 
incidentally, does not address the issue of inflation; since it is a 
synthetic unit of four currencies, the erosion of the real value 
of the SDR will correspond to the erosion of the real value 
of the component currencies, weighted appropriately. Some 
people have suggested that a new international unit of account 
and store of value should for this reason not be linked to any 
currency, and gold has been offered as a candidate. This is not 
the place to review the compelling disadvantages of the gold 
standard, both conceptually and in practice (Cooper 1982, 
1986). Suffice it to say its “disciplines” would be politically 
unacceptable in today’s world.
Benefits anD COsts tO the issuer frOM 
internatiOnal use Of its CurrenCy
A word should be said about the alleged gains that accrue to the 
United States as issuer of the national currency that is widely 
used internationally—what Charles de Gaulle in the Bretton 
Woods days of fixed exchange rates called an “exorbitant privi-
lege.” I have always thought the net benefits, usually unspecified 
but as in de Gaulle’s expression implied to be large, were greatly 
exaggerated. 
A deliberate international decision to 
create an alternative global currency could 
displace the dollar, but that task would 
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The gains usually mentioned are three: seigniorage, ease of 
financing budget (and possibly other) deficits, and employment 
and profits in the financial market. Seigniorage arises from the 
difference between the face value of a unit of currency and its cost 
of production. It is entirely true that the United States benefits 
from seigniorage on the estimated $380 billion of greenbacks 
(currency notes) held around the world: Americans received 
goods and services or assets for them and pay no interest on 
them. But notes are a small part of the international holdings 
of the dollar. Most dollar assets owned abroad pay an interest 
rate in competition with interest rates on other financial assets, 
denominated in either dollars or other currencies. The interest 
rate on Treasury bills is no doubt lower than otherwise because 
of the high liquidity of those instruments. The high liquidity is 
due in part, but only in part, to foreign demand for them. Lately 
some economists have suggested that Americans gain from the 
equity premium, being able to borrow at low interest rates from 
foreigners and investing in higher-yield equities. It is entirely 
true that America earns more on its foreign investments than 
it pays on its (larger) foreign liabilities and that this difference 
in significant measure is explained by the much higher fraction 
of equity in assets than in liabilities. But anyone who is willing 
to take risk can benefit from the equity premium, and many 
individual foreigners (and perhaps sovereign wealth funds) do 
so. That gain arises from risk taking, not from seigniorage.
Having a larger potential clientele for one’s government 
securities of course makes it easier to finance government defi-
cits in normal times. It also means, however, that the govern-
ment has to maintain the confidence of this larger and diverse 
clientele, especially in abnormal times.
International use of the dollar undoubtedly brings business 
to some US financial institutions. But the growth of London 
as the leading international financial center suggests that finan-
cial activity and the national origin of the currencies used are 
separate issues. London has adapted well to international use 
of the dollar, as it increasingly is to growing international use 
of the euro.
Moreover, against benefits must be set potential costs. Two 
come to mind. First, international opinion must be taken into 
account when framing economic policy, especially monetary 
policy, and international opinion may be more demanding than 
domestic opinion. (Of course, international opinion must be 
taken into account these days by any country that relies signifi-
cantly on foreign capital, particularly foreign private capital, 
for its development; this is not a peculiarity of reserve-currency 
countries.)
Second, to the extent a currency’s international role raises 
world demand for it, its value in terms of other currencies is 
enhanced, which makes producers in the  country issuing that 
currency less competitive in world markets than they would 
otherwise be. For this reason alone, many Americans would 
actually welcome a diminished international role for the dollar.
China anD the us DOllar
A  quite  different  but  related  question  is  sometimes  asked, 
particularly by those concerned with US national security: 
With its extensive dollar holdings, could China (or any other 
country with large dollar holdings) destabilize the US finan-
cial system, or otherwise seriously harm the US economy, if it 
chose to use its dollar holdings as a weapon? The basic answer 
is negative, although it could cause transitory turbulence in 
particular markets. To see why, one must look at the actions 
that the Chinese (or whichever) government could actually 
take. There are broadly three possibilities. Since China still 
runs a balance of payments surplus, two of these possibilities 
can be framed in terms of what China does with its increased 
intake of dollars; analogous arguments apply to changes in 
China’s outstanding holdings of dollars.
The first possibility is that China could simply stop inter-
vening in the foreign exchange market to acquire additional 
dollars or any other currency. The consequence of such an 
action would be for the Chinese yuan to appreciate against the 
US dollar (and other currencies), reducing the competitive-
ness of China’s exports in world markets. Since this is what 
many American economists (e.g., Goldstein and Lardy 2009) 
and more subtly the American government have been asking 
China to do for the past half decade, it hardly seems a good 
way to harm the United States—unless, as Ronald McKinnon 
(2006) and some others have argued, this has been an utterly 
misguided recommendation by these Americans.
The second possibility is that the Chinese could switch 
their foreign exchange intervention from dollars to euros or yen 
or some other currencies. So long as China is running a surplus, 
this change would lead to an appreciation of the euro or yen or 
other currencies, and possibly the yuan, against the US dollar. As 
noted, some appreciation of the yuan against the dollar would 
be generally welcome. In many periods, Americans, particularly 
manufacturers, might also welcome some depreciation of the 
China is now stuck with its huge amount 
of dollar holdings for the foreseeable 
future; there is no low-cost way for China 
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dollar against the other currencies. But this development would 
be  distinctly  unwelcome,  especially  at  the  current  time,  by 
Europe and Japan, both of which would make their displeasure 
known to the Chinese. If the yen dropped below 90 per dollar, 
the Japanese authorities would likely resume their intervention 
(which ceased in spring 2004) in the foreign exchange market 
to prevent further appreciation of the yen. That is, Japan would 
replace China as the acquirer of dollar securities. European 
decision making is more complicated, but if the euro rose above 
$1.60  per  euro,  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  would 
likely ease monetary policy to reduce the upward pressure on 
the euro, leading investors around the world to acquire dollar- 
instead of euro-denominated securities, thereby substituting 
for the erstwhile Chinese purchases. If that did not suffice, the 
ECB might intervene directly in the foreign exchange market, 
thus acquiring dollar-denominated securities. In either case, 
the  Europeans  would  complain  vigorously  to  China  about 
its acquisition of euros, since while the ECB formally takes 
a neutral position toward the use of euros as an international 
currency, it has actively discouraged Iceland and some Central 
European countries from adopting the euro, and it would not 
appreciate great appreciation of the euro against the dollar and 
other major currencies. The main point is that Americans are 
less sensitive to the exchange rate of the dollar than are export-
dependent Japanese and Europeans, and their actions directly 
or indirectly would offset China’s withdrawal from the market 
in dollar securities.
The third possible action is that China could change the 
composition of its large reserves from one dollar security to 
another. For example, it was widely believed (China does not 
release such details) that in 2007 China held large amounts of 
US agency securities. By selling these and buying US treasur-
ies China could no doubt have temporarily disequilibrated the 
market  for  agency  bonds  without  influencing  any  exchange 
rates.  But  of  course  once  US  authorities  learned  what  the 
Chinese were doing, they could reverse it through their own 
actions—e.g., by selling treasuries and buying agency securities. 
And indeed this particular possibility has now disappeared with 
the virtual nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
two agencies with large volumes of outstanding securities.
In short, having acquired large amounts of dollar securi-
ties, for practical (and self-interested) reasons, China is now 
stuck with them for the foreseeable future; there is no low-cost 
way for China to disgorge them at its own initiative.
COnClusiOn
To sum up, the US dollar is likely to remain the dominant inter-
national currency for many years, certainly the next decade and 
probably longer. Given its initial advantage of wide acceptance, 
no other currency seems likely to overtake it. International use 
of the euro will grow, perhaps even more rapidly than that of 
the dollar for some years, but because of limitations on issuers 
and financial markets, it is not likely to displace the dollar. In a 
growing world economy, there is room for both.
A deliberate international decision to create an alterna-
tive global currency could displace the dollar, but that task 
would confront formidable practical difficulties. The prospec-
tive gains from such a creation would have to be sufficiently 
great to make governments willing to overcome the practical 
difficulties and to adopt the complementary policies (mainly 
concerning exchange rates) that would be necessary to give a 
new international currency a compelling advantage over pres-
ent arrangements.
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